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This paper examines the nature of aid projections in IMF programs with low-income countries.  On 
average, IMF projections of net aid increased sharply in the first year of programs but tapered off in 
subsequent years. Projections were also significantly more optimistic in countries with low initial 
levels of aid but differed little across regions.  Most notably, projections of net aid to countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa following the Gleneagles Summit are significantly more pessimistic than the 
path implied by commitments to double aid to Africa by 2010.  This pattern is strong throughout the 
group with only two Sub-Saharan African countries showing increases in net aid consistent with the 
Gleneagles commitments. 
 
We argue that much greater clarity is needed about the role of the IMF in the aid architecture. In 
addition to projecting likely aid flows based on detailed discussions with donors, the IMF should 
utilize sector-level inputs to assess the macroeconomic effects of a significant scaling-up of aid in 
programs with low-income countries. Such a scenario would help the international community and 
the country itself judge whether there are any macroeconomic constraints to absorbing more aid. The 
obvious benchmark to use for aid levels in such a scenario would be what donors have committed to 
globally--i.e. a doubling of aid in the case of African countries. Finally, we conclude that the IMF 
should be more transparent about what its collective program projections imply for the expected path 





The Center for Global Development is an independent think tank that works to reduce global poverty and 
inequality through rigorous research and active engagement with the policy community. Use and 
dissemination of this working paper is encouraged, however reproduced copies may not be used for 
commercial purposes. Further usage is permitted under the terms of the Creative Commons License. This 
paper was made possible in part by funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The views 
expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the directors or funders of the Center for 




 What Have IMF Programs With Low-Income 
Countries Assumed About Aid Flows?
1
 
David Goldsbrough and Ben Elberger
2
 
The issue of what projections for aid the IMF should incorporate into its programs is 
controversial.  The IMF position has generally been that it should make the best possible 
estimates of aid flows that are likely to be delivered, drawing on detailed discussions with donors 
about their intentions, but that it would be counterproductive to base programs on overly 
optimistic assumptions.  For example, the Managing Director of the IMF, Mr. Rodrigo De Rato, 
said in a recent speech: “it doesn’t do low-income countries any favors to pretend that they will 
receive more aid than they actually will—in a world where commitments still usually exceed 
disbursements.” 
3   In contrast, some critics argue that the IMF is overly cautious in its 
projections, thereby sending a signal to potential donors that lower volumes of aid would be, in 
some sense, sufficient.
4   These critics call for the IMF to play more of a catalytic role, by 
incorporating more optimistic projections into its baseline programs as well as through 
macroeconomic assessments of scenarios that incorporate an ambitious scaling-up of aid.  These 
differences of view reflect sharply contrasting perspectives about what signals the IMF should be 
sending to the international community about aid.  Indeed, there is still a lack of clarity within 
the IMF itself about exactly what is expected of IMF staff in their work on aid-dependent 
countries, an issue we will return to in the concluding section. 
 
In the context of this broader debate, this paper examines what the IMF has actually assumed 
about net aid flows in the programs it supports.  We focus on the baseline projections (not any 
alternative scenarios) and ask the following questions: 
 
•  What has been the profile of net aid flows assumed in IMF programs with low-income 
countries? 
 
•  Has this profile changed over time or for particular groups of countries, especially Sub-
Saharan Africa? 
 
•  How do countries’ starting positions influence the IMF projections?  (For example, is aid 
to countries with relatively low per capita aid assumed to grow faster?) 
                                                 
1 This paper is one of the background papers prepared for the Working Group on IMF –Supported Programs and 
Health Expenditures under the Center for Global Development’s Global Health Policy Research Network.  A 
description of the project is available at http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/ghprn/workinggroups . JEL 
Codes: F33, F35, F37.  Keywords: International Monetary Fund, foreign aid, ODA, projections, Gleneagles Summit, 
macroeconomic frameworks, macroeconomic programs, Africa. 
2 David Goldsbrough is a senior fellow and Ben Elberger a research assistant at the Center for Global Development. 
3 Rodrigo de Rato.  “Renewing the IMF’s Commitment to Low-Income Countries” (speech, Center for Global 
Development, Washington, DC, July 31, 2006). 
4 Oxfam International, The IMF and the Millennium Development Goals: Failing to deliver for low-income 
countries, Report.  September 2003. 
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•  How do the projections of aid in recent IMF programs compare with donors’ global 
commitments, such as at the Gleneagles G-8 Summit, and have these projections become 
more optimistic post-Gleneagles? 
 
Our focus is on what the IMF has assumed, not on actual outcomes.  Earlier evidence suggests 
that, compared to outcomes, IMF program projections have not been unduly pessimistic.  For 
example, the 2004 evaluation of the PRSP and PRGF by the Independent Evaluation Office of 
the IMF concluded that, on average, program design allowed for larger external financing flows 
than actually occurred.
5  But more recent evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that initial 
IMF programs may have under-predicted aid for the medium term.
6 Of course, such comparisons 
cannot answer the broader questions of whether the IMF should be playing a more proactive role 
in mobilizing additional aid and what the impact might be on aid levels. 
 
To address the questions listed above, we looked at projections of net aid over the medium term 
in two sets of IMF programs:  (i) all original IMF-supported programs under its concessional 
lending facilities—the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility ( ESAF) and its successor, the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) during the period January 1997 through January 
2007 (77 programs in 46 countries);
7  and (ii) all original programs and any reviews (i.e., any 
time the IMF formally revisited its aid projections) in the 18-month period before and after the 
July 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit.  
 
Details of the data sources and the countries and programs included in each data set are given in 
Appendix I. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, net aid is defined as grants plus gross concessional loans less 
amortization actually paid (i.e., after taking account of debt service flow relief).  Extracting this 
information from IMF reports proved more difficult than we had expected, since the treatment of 
some components of aid flows—especially debt relief—is complex and varies substantially 
among different country reports. 
 
Aid Projections in Original Programs 
 
The broad profile for projected aid has been remarkably similar across different groups of 
countries.  For all programs, aid is projected to expand substantially in the initial program year 
(t0) (by 26 percent for the entire sample) before tapering off by the third year (t2) (Table 1 and 
Figure 1).  This pattern holds true for projections of aid in Sub-Saharan African countries.  The 
table shows both median and unweighted means (excluding three outliers)
8 and the broad pattern 
is the same for both measures. 
 
                                                 
5 Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund, Evaluation of the IMF’s Role in Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,  2004. See Chapter 4, page 51. 
6 Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund, An Evaluation of the IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2007.  See especially Annex B. 
7 Some programs could not be included either because the program documents have not been made public or 
because the projections did not cover the full 3-year period on which we focused. 
8 Sri Lanka (2003 PRGF), Central African Republic (1998 ESAF), Ethiopia (1998 ESAF) 








Table 1.  Net Aid Flow Projections (Normalized to Net Aid at t-1 of 100) 
  Region  Program Vintage 
  Average Projections      Average Projections   
 Category  t-1 t0 t1 t2 N   Category  t-1 t0 t1 t2 N 
All  100  130 129 118 74  ESAF  100 155 131 112  27 
SSA  100  134 131 120 46  PRGF  100 114 128 122  47 
  Median Projections      Median Projections   
 Category  t-1 t0 t1 t2 N   Category  t-1 t0 t1 t2 N 
All  100  116 112 102 77  ESAF  100 126 110 100  29 
SSA  100  117 115 102 48  PRGF  100 106 113 103  48 
















































         t-1                               t0                               t1                                 t2 
Under the PRGF, projected aid grew more steadily through the second year of the projection but 
also tapered off by the third year (Table 1).  By the end of the program, aid projections for PRGF 
programs generally exceeded those for ESAF programs.
9  The increase in projected aid between 
the two groups of programs was much larger for the means than the medians, indicating that the 
increases in aid projections under the PRGF were not uniformly distributed. 
 
We examined the influences of several factors on the medium-term program projections for aid, 
using the percentage change in net aid over the 3-year period as the dependent variable. (PRGF 
                                                 
9 Our data set only includes the last two years of ESAF-supported programs.  Comparisons using the full sample of 
all ESAF arrangements have found a larger change between the ESAF and PRGF.  (See, for example, IEO (2004), 
op cit). Conclusions on any shifts in aid profiles between the ESAF and PRGF also depend substantially on whether 
the changes are measured from the year in which the program was concluded (t0) or the preceding year (t-1). 
  3arrangements are for an initial period of 3 years and this period is the focus of most program 
projections for the “medium term”.)  The results indicate that the IMF program projections 
implicitly assumed that countries with low initial levels of aid per capita would benefit from 
faster growth in aid (Table 3 and Figure 2).  Dummy variables testing the importance of 
geographic location (Sub-Saharan Africa) and shift from the ESAF to PRGF were not significant 
at the 5% level.
10  Quantitatively, a 1-percent lower initial net aid per capita was associated with 
a 1-percentage point increase in projected growth in net aid over the 3-year period.  This result 
was, statistically, highly significant.  In other words, IMF program projections implicitly assume 
that countries with lower aid per capita will receive a gradually increasing share of global aid.   
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10 As noted earlier, this may reflect the fact that our sample only includes the “late” vintage of ESAF-supported 
programs. 
  4Table 2.  Multivariate Model Correlates of Projected Net Aid Growth 
  Percent Change in Net Aid Over Program Period  




SSA Dummy    -.5206 
(-1.89)* 
PRGF Dummy    0.0574 
(.21) 





2 0.3267 0.3593 
F  35.3850 13.6449 
N  74 74 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses  * Significant at the 10% level  ** Significant at the 5% level  *** Significant 




How Do IMF Aid Projections Compare with Gleneagles Commitments on Aid? 
 
At the July 2005 Summit at Gleneagles, G8 leaders made a number of commitments that 
indicated a more optimistic environment for official development assistance.  For example, the 
Chair’s summary of the Summit included the following statement, “We have agreed to double 
aid to Africa by 2010. Aid for all developing countries will increase, according to the OECD, by 
around $50 billion per year by 2010, of which at least $25 billion extra per year for Africa.” 
11 
This statement was part of a broader trend of global commitments to expand aid, in total and to 
Africa in particular. To investigate how IMF program projections for aid have responded to this 
changed environment, we examined all publicly available program projections for aid (in 
original programs or reviews) made for countries with PRGF arrangements in the 18 months 
before and after the Summit.
12
 
The results indicate four key conclusions about IMF aid projections: 
 
•  Over the medium-term, the global profile of aid projections in IMF programs is 
substantially less optimistic than the Gleneagles commitments.  Weighted by the 
initial level of aid, average growth in net aid in IMF programs is projected to be 
broadly consistent with Gleneagles commitments in the first and second year of 
projections but diverges starkly in the third year (See Figure 3 and Table 3).
 13  This 
pessimism over the medium term is attributable, in part, to declining aid projections 
                                                 
11 For further details, see the official website of the summit at www.g8.gov.uk
12 Excluding Lesotho (Sixth Review, Pre-G8 Summit) and Azerbaijan (Fifth Review, Pre-G8 Summit).  Lesotho is 
treated as an outlier due to its extremely low initial net aid flow in year t-1 (fiscal year 2003, $1.3 million).  
Azerbaijan is treated as an outlier due to high aid volatility resulting from lumpy amortization payments.  
13 These projections use the assumptions and figures of the OECD-DAC Secretariat Simulation of DAC Members’ 
Net ODA Volumes in 2006 and 2010 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/30/35320618.pdf)  
  5to Afghanistan but is also broad-based with only 37% of post-Gleneagles Summit 
projections more optimistic than the path implied by the Gleneagles commitments.   
 
 
Table 3.  Weighted IMF Aid Projections and the Gleneagles Aid Path
14  
 t -1 t0 t1 t2 Percent Change over 3-Year Period  N 
Implied Gleneagles Aid Path: Global Aid  100 112 124 135  35%   
Implied Gleneagles Aid Path: Aid to SSA  100 116 132 149  49%   
All  Pre-G8  Summit  100 119 121 119  19% 44 
All  Post-G8  Summit  100 114 122 121  21% 43 
SSA Pre-G8 Summit  100  115  117  115  15% 30 
SSA  Post-G8  Summit  100 114 123 121  21% 27 
Non-SSA Pre-G8 Summit  100  136  141  138  38% 14 
Non-SSA Post-G8 Summit  100  115  118  120  20% 16 
 
 
Figure 3. Weighted IMF Net Aid Projections Prior to and 












































IMF Pre-Gleneagles IMF Post-Gleneagles Implied Gleneagles Path
 
         t-1                               t0                               t1                                 t2 
 
•  There is a wide distribution in aid projections.  While the average profile of 
projected aid in IMF programs is not consistent with the Gleneagles commitments, 
there is a wide dispersion of aid projections across countries (Figure 4).  Nearly 39% 
of aid projections project country aid to decrease over the medium term and 24% 
                                                 
14 Weighting is conducted using the level of net aid at t-1 of the projection period.  Unless otherwise noted, all 
averages reported are unweighted. 
  6project aid to increase but by less than implied by the Gleneagles path.  Of those that 
increase at a pace consistent with or faster than the Gleneagles commitments, a small 
number are projected to receive large increases in aid (i.e. Moldova, Armenia, 
Zambia). 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of IMF Net Aid Projections Prior to and 




































Pre-G8 Summit Post-G8 Summit
 
 
•  The profile of IMF aid projections for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa has not 
changed much in the post-Gleneagles period and, on average, remains well short 
of the path that would double aid by 2010.  Mean projected growth of net aid over 
the 3-year period increased by only 4 percentage points and remained well below the 
implied growth of Gleneagles Summit statements (Table 3 and Figure 5).  Of the 27 
IMF programs and reviews in Sub-Saharan Africa that were completed in the post-
Gleneagles period, only two were more optimistic than the Gleneagles projections of 
aid to Africa.
15,16   
 
 
                                                 
15 The two cases were Mozambique (Fourth review in June 2006) and Zambia (Third review in December 2005). 
16 We use OECD DAC-reported ODA to Africa listed in Roodman’s (2005) Net Aid Transfers dataset as the 
baseline for the Implied Gleneagles Aid Path to SSA.   
  7Figure 5. Weighted IMF Net Aid Projections in Sub-Saharan African 














































SSA Pre-Gleneagles SSA Post-Gleneagles
Implied Gleneagles Path Implied Gleneagles Path to SSA
         t-1                               t0                               t1                                 t2 
 
 
•  For countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, the weighted mean projected path 
of aid is closer to a path consistent with the Gleneagles commitments, although 
there was actually some deterioration in the levels of aid projected before and 
after the Summit (Figure 6).  This reflects the relatively small number of countries 
involved and the particular circumstances of Afghanistan (the latter entered into a 
new program with the IMF in 2006, but aid is projected to decline over the medium 
term).  On an unweighted basis, projected aid to countries outside Africa is projected 
to increase substantially (Figure 7).  
 
  8Figure 6. Weighted IMF Net Aid Projections in Countries Outside Sub-














































Non-SSA Pre-Gleneagles Non-SSA Post-Gleneagles Implied Gleneagles Path
Figure 7. Unweighted IMF Net Aid Projections in Countries Outside Sub-
















































Non-SSA Pre-Gleneagles Non-SSA Post-Gleneagles Implied Gleneagles Path
         t-1                               t0                               t1                                 t2 
         t-1                               t0                               t1                                 t2 We examined various influences on this group of projections (see Table 4). Once again, the 
results suggest that IMF program projections have a statistically significant tendency to project 
faster growth in aid when initial net aid per capita is low. After controlling for the influence of 
starting aid levels, the IMF also showed a strong, and statistically significant, tendency to project 
faster growth in non-Sub-Saharan African countries after the Gleneagles Summit. There is little 
evidence, however, to suggest that the IMF assumed faster aid growth in post-Gleneagles Sub-




Table 4. Post-G8 Summit Projections and Multivariate Models 
  Percent Change in Net Aid Over 3 Year Projection Period (t-1 to t2) 
Post-G8 Summit Dummy  .1454 
(1.42)     
 








SSA Dummy  -.3324 
(-3.09)***    -.2134 
(-1.39) 













2 .3014 .2950  .3112 
F  11.94 11.58  9.26 
N  87 87  87 
Notes: t-statistics listed in parentheses  * Significant at the 10% level  *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Is the problem with the Messenger or the Message? 
 
These results indicate that, in its programs for most Sub-Saharan African countries, the IMF has 
serious doubts that donors will meet their commitments to double aid by 2010.  Is the IMF at 
fault for making such relatively conservative projections?  This depends largely on how much of 
a role the IMF should play as a catalyst for aid—an issue we will return to in the concluding 
section.  But recent information from the OECD supports a rather skeptical view of the amounts 
of additional aid that is in the pipeline. 
 
The 2006 OECD Development Cooperation Report updates aid projections in light of a 
compositional analysis of aid, 2005 disbursements, and a DAC survey of key donors on the 
                                                 
17 The IMF has explored the macroeconomic implications of a more rapid scaling-up of aid in alternative scenarios 
for a number of countries. For example, such an alternative scenario for Zambia was benchmarked on the proposed 
doubling of aid to Africa by 2010. (See country case study of Zambia prepared as a background paper for the 
Working Group on IMF Programs and Health Spending). 
  10medium-term outlook (2006-2008).  Official development assistance did, in fact, reach record 
levels in 2005 (in constant 2004 dollars) as a result of one-time debt write-offs to Iraq and 
Nigeria.  However, the DAC survey of donors suggests that the medium-term outlook for ODA 
is decidedly less optimistic.  Taking account of these factors, the OECD simulated the required 
growth of aid in 2009 and 2010 to meet Gleneagles targets (Figure 6).  In this scenario (which is 
not a forecast), the targets for global aid and for aid to Sub-Saharan Africa are possible only with 
fairly heroic annual aid growth in the final years of the decade.  This path for scaling- up aid is, 
of course, still possible but it suggests cause for concern on the degree to which the broad 




Figure 8: OECD DAC Simulation to Gleneagles Target 
 
 
Note: Data points prior to 2005 are disbursements, for 2006-2008 are projections based on a survey of donors, and 
for 2009-2010 simulate the necessary aid scale-up to reach the 2005 Gleneagles targets. 





There is no straightforward measuring rod for determining the “desirable” level of aid for a 
country. Macroeconomic frameworks that merely extrapolate past levels of aid, on the grounds 
of prudence, would not fulfill the IMF’s undertaking to help countries manage the 
macroeconomic challenges of absorbing increased aid flows. The evidence discussed in the 
paper suggests that the IMF has moved beyond such very conservative projections. However, 
looking at programs collectively, it has not gone so far as to take the donor community at their 
word that increased aid for Africa will be available in the amounts suggested at the Gleneagles 
Summit.   Of course, the caution suggested by the earlier quote from Mr. De Rato’s speech may 
well be justified.  There is a history of actual aid falling short of donor commitments and recent 
OECD projections provide some grounds for such skepticism. Nevertheless, the extent of the 
shortfall between what the IMF is assuming for Africa and donors’ global statements is striking 
and suggests the need for greater clarity about the IMF role in this area. 
  11 
Economic analysis alone cannot provide the answer on the appropriate role for the IMF in the 
international aid architecture.  This, ultimately, depends on how proactive donor and recipient 
countries want the IMF to be in providing catalytic signals about levels of aid.  But much greater 
clarity is needed about exactly what signal the IMF is sending to donors through its medium-
term macroeconomic projections. There are four broad options: 
 
1.  The IMF would take the level of aid as given, based on a survey of donors’ existing 
intentions. It would derive a macroeconomic framework consistent with this aid 
level and objectives of macro stability. But it would state explicitly that it took no 
view whatsoever on the compatibility of this framework and level of aid with any 
objectives related to development or achieving the MDGs, which were beyond its 
expertise. 
2.  The IMF would take the level of aid as given and prepare the macro framework as 
in the first case.  Based on inputs from others, it would also give its judgment if 
there were strong reasons to doubt that this framework were compatible with the 
MDGs.
18 
3.  The IMF would make an assessment, based on sector-level inputs, of the 
macroeconomic effects of a significant scaling-up of aid so as to help the 
international community and the country itself judge whether there are any 
macroeconomic constraints to absorbing  more aid. This assessment could be in the 
form of an alternative scenario.  The obvious benchmark to use for the level of aid 
assumed in such a scenario would be that aid grows at least as fast as implied in 
donors’ commitments for global aid (e.g. each African country would have a 
scenario consistent with a doubling of aid by 2010.) 
4.  Working with sector-level inputs from others, the IMF would devise a 
macroeconomic framework and estimates of aid requirements to achieve the MDGs 
(i.e. the full-fledged “needs-based” approach).
19 
 
Our preferred option would be the third one, which would give the IMF a more clearly defined 
signaling role for aid-dependent countries and could be combined with mechanisms to provide 
greater feedback to donors on performance vis-à-vis their commitments on expanding aid.  At 
the very least, the IMF should be much more transparent about what its collective program 
projections imply for the expected path of global aid flows.  
 
                                                 
18 The IMF’s recently announced medium-term strategy contains language that seems to suggest this option: “in the 
future, staff papers will not only assess whether macroeconomic policies support the MDGs, but will also frankly 
report the assessment of the World Bank and donors on the achievability of the MDGs under what the Fund would 
consider to be realistic macroeconomic scenarios and financing envelopes.” (The Managing Director’s Report on 
the Fund’s Medium-Term Strategy, September 15, page 9.) 
19 The MDGs provide global social targets that have received broad international endorsement and therefore are a 
natural starting point for judging performance, both of donors and recipient countries.  But translating the MDGs 
into estimates of overall aid “needs” involves many complications and the track record of such approaches based on 
estimates of financing gaps to be filled by aid is not good.  The background paper on The Nature of the Debate 
between the IMF and its Critics, also prepared for the Working Group on IMF Programs and Health Spending, 
discusses these issues in more detail. 
  12Appendix I 
 
Sources and Definitions 
 
We constructed two databases on IMF net aid projections.  The first data set covers the original 
medium-term projections for aid in all programs supported by the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) or the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) between January 
1997 and January 2007.  The second data set covers not only original programs, but also all 
reviews (i.e., all occasions at which the IMF might formally revisit its projections) between 
January 1, 2004, and January 31, 2007.   
 
Most IMF programs include projections for the year in which the program is agreed (year t0) and 
at least two subsequent years (i.e., through year t2), which is the period covered in the paper.  
Several programs were not included either because the relevant IMF documents have not been 
made public or because projections were not made for all of this period.  The full list of 
programs (and reviews) covered in each data set is given in the attached table. 
 
The definition of net aid used in the paper is the sum of grants and net concessional lending (i.e., 
gross loans less amortization actually paid, after debt service flow relief).  In most cases, the 
necessary information was available from the Balance of Payments or External Financing 
Requirements tables of IMF reports, but in a few cases, we had to take the data on grants from 
the Fiscal tables. 
 
The majority of programs listed aid flows in nominal U.S. dollars and, where this was not the 
case, we used market exchange rates from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators to 
convert.   Net aid per capita was calculated using population data from the World Development 
Indicators as well.
20

















                                                 
20 For Afghanistan (PRGF, 2006), the World Development Indicators did not publish recent population data.  For 
this case, the authors used data from the CIA World Factbook. 
  13DATASET 1 
Country t0 Vintage Country  t0 Vintage 
Afghanistan 2006  PRGF  Malawi  2001  PRGF 
Albania 1999  ESAF  Malawi  2005  PRGF 
Albania 2002  PRGF  Mali  1998  ESAF 
Albania 2005  PRGF  Mali  2004  PRGF 
Armenia 1998  ESAF  Mauritania  1999  ESAF 
Armenia 2001  PRGF  Mauritania  2003  PRGF 
Armenia 2005  PRGF  Moldova  2006  PRGF 
Azerbaijan 1997  ESAF  Mongolia  2001  PRGF 
Azerbaijan 2001  PRGF  Mozambique  1999  ESAF 
Bangladesh 2003  PRGF  Mozambique  2004  PRGF 
Benin 1998  ESAF  Nepal  2003  PRGF 
Benin 2000  PRGF  Nicaragua  1999  ESAF 
Benin 2005  PRGF  Nicaragua  2002  PRGF 
Bolivia 1998  ESAF  Niger  1998  ESAF 
Bolivia 2001  PRGF  Niger  2000  PRGF 
Burkina Faso  1998  ESAF  Niger  2005  PRGF 
Burkina Faso  2003  PRGF  Rwanda  1998  ESAF 
Burundi 2004  PRGF  Rwanda  2002  PRGF 
Cambodia 1999  ESAF  Rwanda  2006  PRGF 
Cameroon 1998  ESAF  Senegal  1998  ESAF 
Cameroon 2000  PRGF  Senegal  2003  PRGF 
Cameroon 2005  PRGF  Sierra  Leone  2005  PRGF 
Central African Republic  1998  ESAF  Sri Lanka  2003  PRGF 
Chad 2000  PRGF  Tajikistan  1999  ESAF 
Chad 2005  PRGF  Tanzania  1998  ESAF 
Cote d'Ivoire  1998  ESAF  Tanzania  2003  PRGF 
Djibouti 1999  ESAF  Uganda  1998  ESAF 
Ethiopia 1998  ESAF  Uganda  2002  PRGF 
The Gambia  1998  ESAF  Vietnam  2001  PRGF 
The Gambia  2001  PRGF  Yemen  1999  ESAF 
Georgia 1998  ESAF  Zambia  1999  ESAF 
Georgia 2001  PRGF       
Ghana 2003  PRGF       
Guinea 1999  ESAF       
Guinea 2001  PRGF       
Guinea-Bissau 2001  PRGF       
Haiti 2006  PRGF       
Honduras 2004  PRGF       
Kyrgyz Republic  1998  ESAF       
Kyrgyz Republic  2005  PRGF       
Laos 2001  PRGF       
Lesotho 2000  PRGF       
Madagascar 1999  ESAF       
Madagascar 2006  PRGF       
Malawi 1998  ESAF       
 
 
  14DATASET 2: INCLUDED 
Country Name  Program or Review (#)  "Report Completed" Date 
Afghanistan Program  5/15/2006
Albania Review  (3)  1/8/2004
Albania Review  (4)  6/21/2004
Albania Review  (5)  2/8/2005
Albania Review  (6)  7/22/2005
Albania Program  1/12/2006
Albania Review  (1)  7/7/2006
Armenia Review  (5)  4/15/2004
Armenia Review  (6)  11/17/2004
Armenia Program  5/10/2005
Armenia Review  (1)  9/7/2005
Armenia Review  (2)  5/3/2006
Armenia Review  (3)  11/3/2006
Bangladesh Review  (3)  6/7/2005
Bangladesh Review  (4)  1/19/2006
Bangladesh Review  (5)  10/6/2006
Benin Review  (6)  2/19/2004
Benin Program  7/22/2005
Benin Review  (1)  11/10/2006
Burkina Faso  Review (1)  3/4/2004
Burkina Faso  Review (2 & 3)  12/21/2004
Burkina Faso  Review (4)  8/23/2005
Burkina Faso  Review (6)  8/28/2006
Burundi Program  1/6/2004
Burundi Review  (1)  12/21/2004
Burundi Review  (2)  7/8/2005
Burundi  Review (3 & 4)  6/30/2006
Cameroon Program  10/15/2005
Chad Program  2/4/2005
Democratic Republic of Congo  Review (4)  6/28/2004
Democratic Republic of Congo  Review (5)  8/12/2005
Ethiopia Review  (6)  8/18/2004
Georgia Review  (2)  7/6/2005
Georgia Review  (3)  3/17/2006
Georgia Review  (4)  9/14/2006
Ghana Review  (2)  6/15/2004
Haiti Program  11/6/2006
Honduras Program  2/3/2004
Honduras Review  (1)  9/10/2004
Honduras Review  (2)  3/15/2005
Kyrgyz Republic  Review (5)  6/14/2004
Kyrgyz Republic  Review (6) & Program  2/8/2005
Kyrgyz Republic  Review (1)  10/7/2005
Kyrgyz Republic  Review (2)  4/20/2006
Madagascar Review  (5)  9/30/2004
Madagascar Review  (6)  2/3/2005
Madagascar Program  7/6/2006
Madagascar Review  (1)  12/4/2006
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Malawi Program  7/22/2005
Malawi Review  (1)  2/6/2006
Malawi Review  (2)  8/15/2006
Mali Program  5/21/2004
Mali Review  (1)  2/7/2005
Mali  Review (2 & 3)  12/8/2005
Mali Review  (4)  6/29/2006
Moldova Program  4/20/2006
Mozambique Program  6/7/2004
Mozambique Review  (1)  1/28/2005
Mozambique Review  (2)  6/6/2005
Mozambique Review  (3)  12/5/2005
Mozambique Review  (4)  6/1/2006
Nepal Review  (1)  10/7/2004
Nepal  Review (2 & 3)  10/27/2006
Niger Review  (6)  6/15/2004
Niger Program  1/21/2005
Niger Review  (1)  11/28/2005
Niger Review  (2)  6/5/2006
Niger Review  (3)  12/6/2006
Rwanda  Review (2 & 3)  5/24/2004
Rwanda Review  (4)  3/25/2005
Rwanda Review  (5)  8/18/2005
Rwanda  Review (6) & Program  5/19/2006
Senegal Review  (2)  2/15/2005
Sierra Leone  Review (6)  5/10/2005
Sierra Leone  Program  3/10/2006
Tanzania Review  (2)  7/7/2004
Tanzania Review  (3)  2/10/2005
Tanzania Review  (4)  7/18/2005
Tanzania Review  (5)  3/24/2006
Uganda Review  (3)  7/16/2004
Uganda Review  (4)  1/31/2005
Uganda Review  (5)  6/23/2005
Uganda Review  (6)  1/6/2006
Zambia Program  5/28/2004
Zambia Review  (2)  3/25/2005
Zambia Review  (3)  12/22/2005
Zambia Review  (4)  6/27/2006
 
 Appendix II.  OECD World Aid Projections (in billions of US dollars; nominal terms) 
Source  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 2006 2007 2008  2009  2010 
DCR2002 p.13 
Where official development 
assistance is concerned, the 
increase in volume over the coming 
years, to which the mast majority of 
DAC countries committed at, or in 
the wake of, the Monterrey 
Conference, is unprecedented in 
over ten years.  It is estimated that 
the realisation of these 
commitments would raise the 
ODA/GNI ratio for all DAC countries 
from .22% in 2001 (unchanged from 
the previous year) to .26% in 2006, 
the volume in real terms being 
some USD 16 billion up on the 2001 
figure (USD 52.336 billion) 
$ 52.3  $   56.5  $ 60.7  $ 65.1  $   69.7  $ 74.3         
DCR2003  p.22 
2002 Net ODA in 2002 dollars = 
$58,300,000 
2006 Net ODA in 2002 dollars = 
$76,800,000 
  $   58.3  $ 64.0  $ 69.9  $   78.4  $  82.2         
From 2004DCR p.19:  
2003 Net ODA disbursements in 
2003 dollars = $69,029,000 
2006 Net ODA disbursements in 
2003 dollars = $88,446,000 
p.22 Delivery of these commitments 
would suggest that total ODA from 
DAC members should rise to 
USD$100 billion in 2003 terms 
    $ 69.0  $ 76.8  $   84.8  $  93.0  $  97.7  $ 102.5  $ 107.4  $ 112.5 
 
OECD-DAC Secretariat 
Simulation of DAC Members' Net 
ODA Volumes in 2006 and 2010 




  $ 79.5  $   90.0  $ 100.9  $ 110.6  $ 120.7  $ 131.1  $ 141.8 
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